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Abstract 
 
Location information of sensor nodes has become 
an essential part of many applications in Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSN). The importance of location 
estimation and object tracking has made them the 
target of many security attacks. Various methods have 
tried to provide location information with high 
accuracy, while lots of them have neglected the fact 
that WSNs may be deployed in hostile environments. In 
this paper, we address the problem of securely 
tracking a Mobile Node (MN) which has been noticed 
very little previously. A novel secure tracking 
algorithm is proposed based on Extended Kalman 
Filter (EKF) that is capable of tracking a Mobile Node 
(MN) with high resolution in the presence of 
compromised or colluding malicious beacon nodes. It 
filters out and identifies the malicious beacon data in 
the process of tracking. The proposed method 
considerably outperforms the previously proposed 
secure algorithms in terms of either detection rate or 
MSE. The experimental data based on different settings 
for the network has shown promising results. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The development of small, low-power, low-cost and 
multifunctional sensor nodes have offered viable 
solutions for wide range of applications. Various 
applications have been proposed for such networks and 
a number of them have been already deployed. Many 
of these applications require the knowledge of the 
location of the nodes. Environmental monitoring, 
emergency rescue, target detection and military 
surveillance and tracking need to know location 
information as a priori. Location information is also a 
necessity in different operations of networks such as 
routing and security protocols [4]. To fulfill this 
emerging demand numerous algorithms have been 
proposed to provide accurate location information.  
Despite the extensive studies conducted on 
localization of sensors in trusted environments, few 
have considered this process in hostile environments. 
Since the sensors may be deployed in unsupervised 
manner they are susceptible to many security threats 
trying to corrupt the proper function of localization 
process. Many of these threats are not the conventional 
security threats and they target the reliability of 
location information instead [5]. Since localization 
techniques mainly use different features of radio 
signals of devices as their input data, e.g. Time of 
Arrival (TOA) and Received Signal Strength (RSS), an 
adversary can easily influence the measurements by 
jamming and replying or modifying the signal 
strengths. Hence, the performance of location 
estimation techniques is severely ruined when used in 
hostile environments.  
Secure localization problem has been addressed in 
different variants. Some has enhanced the robustness 
of localization process in hostile environments and 
some has gone for verification of the estimated 
location before they are further incorporated into the 
process of localizing other nodes. 
Several techniques have been proposed to securely 
localize sensor nodes in hostile environments [6], [7], 
[8], [9] but to our best knowledge secure tracking of 
mobile objects in WSNs has received very little 
attention.  
Conventional tracking algorithms incorporate 
Bayesian filtering, particle filters or EKF filters. For 
higher accuracy of the estimated path, different motion 
models may be defined to account for more intricate 
movements [6]. Some solutions to tracking problem 
based on Kalman Filtering have been suggested in [1], 
[10] and [11], but none of them has considered the 
security of the procedure. When false locations are 
injected into network they fail to provide the correct 
solution and in most cases diverge. 
For cost effectiveness, sensor nodes in WSN 
estimate their location based on the information they 
obtain from nodes with fixed known locations, called 
Anchor nodes, which are usually supposed to be 
tamper proof. Anchors are, however, highly vulnerable 
to be subverted during operation phase, the 
consequence of which would be false data being 
injected into network and hence the process of tracking 
will not come up with the correct trajectory for the 
MN. In this paper, we formulate a secure accurate 
tracking algorithm which is able to track the object 
under study in the presence of high measurement noise 
and compromised anchor nodes. It is able to identify 
and filter out the misbehaving anchors. The remainder 
of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the state 
of the art in tracking and the attempts made to provide 
robuster algorithms. In section 3 we formulate the state 
and measurement model. The process of removing the 
malicious anchors is described in section 4 and 
simulation results are explained in section 5. 
 
3. Related work 
Reliable estimation location estimation of nodes suffer 
from both inherent errors imposed by transmission 
medium and attacks conducted to deliberately change 
the physical medium and hence the input data to 
localization algorithms. As for the limited resources 
available in WSNs, traditional security techniques 
based on cryptography cannot be used as the main 
defense. In fact the advantage of non-cryptographic 
algorithms is better understood in the presence of 
compromised nodes where the attacker can 
authenticate itself and the integrity checks fail to 
identify erroneous packets.  
In [6] a rang-independent localization algorithm with a 
special framework has been introduced which provides 
protection against most of the attacks on distance 
estimation. [4] has proposed methods for identification 
and robust computation of location by comparing the 
MMSE of sensors location information with some 
consistent nodes and further utilizing a voting-based 
algorithm, respectively. In [5] least square method is 
used to localize nodes and least median square method 
when the network is determined to be under attack. 
Although the mentioned methods and several more has 
been proposed for robust positioning of nodes, little 
work has been done for secure tracking of network 
nodes. 
The secure tracking based on Bayesian Filtering in [2] 
proposes to activate 3 adjacent nodes for tracking the 
MN at each time step and further use a relaxation 
labeling algorithm to identify and remove the false data 
by malicious nodes. The malicious nodes are identified 
if the Euclidean of their calculated belief for the state 
of the system is drastically different for those of benign 
ones. The MN is supposed to have a linear motions 
model and the attack is simulated by assuming the 
reports of the malicious nodes being located on a 
predetermined artificial path. To assess the algorithm 
the proposed relaxation labeling method is compared 
with simply averaging the results of particle filtering 
for each of the 3 nodes at each time step. 15 sensor 
nodes are deployed within [0,30] and MSE of the 
results compared to the true target path with one or two 
attackers are 12.107, 13.382. Another secure tracking 
is also explained in [3], which supposes the MN to be 
pseudo-static and tracks its path through iterative 
application of a localization algorithm. This, however, 
imposes more complexity than conventional tracking 
techniques. It calculates the position of the target as the 
intersection of the circles centered at the anchors with 
its radius equal to the estimated distance by that sensor. 
The attacks are simulated only by distance enlargement 
and an anchor is determined to be malicious if its 
reported position of the target is different from the 
estimated one. It has also determined that the number 
of trustful anchors for correct localization should be at 
least equal to the number of malicious anchors plus 
four. 
 
3. Target Tracking 
 
3.1. System model assumptions 
1) It is assumed that the network consists of at least 
one base station and a set of uniformly deployed 
anchors with fixed known locations. 
2) Malicious anchor nodes are capable of 
establishing their authenticity with the rest of the 
sensors and have access to the shared symmetric 
keys. 
3) Received Signal Strength (RSS) values of sensor 
nodes are used as the input data for the process of 
tracking.  
4) Sensor nodes other than anchors will estimate 
their location based on the measurements 
provided by anchors.   
5) The malicious anchor nodes, which are able to 
collude, will report enlarged or reduced locations 
to the base station. 
 
3.2. Tracking technique 
 
The measurements obtained from sensor nodes are 
used in Extended Kalman Filter to arrive at the state of 
the system. The process is governed by the following 
nonlinear difference equation: 
    =  (    ,     ),      ~ (0,   )        (Eq. 1) 
Where    represents the state vector in the  
   moment 
and    is the corresponding process noise. The 
measurement equation is: 
    = ℎ(  ,   ),        ~ (0,   )               (Eq. 2) 
In which    and    are the measurement vector and its 
noise in the     moment, respectively.     represents 
the measurement noise covariance which reflects 
the quality of the received measurements. 
The empirically verified equation used to model the 
measured power (RSS) and the corresponding distance 
( ) between the transmitter and the receiver is 
  [  ]=   [  ]−  .        
 
  
 
 
+       (Eq. 3) 
Where α is the path loss parameter,     and    are the 
received and emitted powers. As it is mentioned in [1], 
( ) is the log-normal shadow fading which is modeled 
as a normal distribution with zero mean. 
Taking the reference distance    = 1  the 
received signal strength can be modeled as: 
  , =    −       [  
 −   
 
+ (  −  )
 ] +                   
                                                                                     (Eq. 4) 
In this equation, (  ,   ) is the coordinate of MN in 
the     moment. The coordinate of      anchor node is 
(  ,   ) and the corresponding measured RSS is 
represented by   , .  
The adopted measurements model is the one used 
in [1]. Thus, the measurements,   
 , are as follows: 
   
  = 10 (  
    )/                                      (Eq. 5) 
Reformulating this equation we obtain the 
measurement model used 
   
  = [   −   
 
+ (  −  )
 ] × 10  /   (Eq. 6) 
The EKF time-update equations will be as follows: 
 
Table 1. EKF time-update equations 
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And the measurement-update equations are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. EKF measurement-update equations 
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                                (Eq. 7) 
In the preceding equations,    = [    ̇      ̇ ]  
represents the state vector of the system which we 
assumed to be the coordinates of the source node along 
with the corresponding velocities in two dimensional 
axes and thus   would be as shown in Eq. 7. 
As the measurement equation is nonlinear it should 
be linearized around predicted target state. Here H is 
the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of ℎ(. ) with 
respect to   that in fact indicates what the 
measurements can say about the state vector. 
 [ , ]=
 ℎ[ ]
  [ ]
(  , 0)                                        (Eq. 8) 
V is the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of ℎ(. ) 
with respect to: 
 [ , ]=
 ℎ[ ]
  [ ]
(  , 0)                                         (Eq. 9) 
Whose elements will be [1]: 
 
 
ℎ ,1
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ℎ ,3
  = 2    −1 −  
 
 
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 
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 
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                                    (Eq. 10) 
and, 
 
  , 
  = −
  10
 
∙   
 
 
2
  , 
  = 0                         
                                      (Eq. 11) 
 
4. Detection of Malicious Sensors 
 
As the measurements of anchors are used to 
estimate the position of sensor nodes, the presence of 
false data will greatly affect the predicted trajectory 
and the process of filtering will diverge most of the 
time. So, the proper operation of the previously 
proposed algorithms of tracking is very dependent on 
the detection and discarding the false data. 
False measurements will change the Kalman gain 
introduced in table 2 and as a result the posterior 
values of the state of the system will not be valid. 
Thus, it is tried to identify and remove the sensors with 
malicious activities during the process of Kalman 
Filter. The introduction of false data will also introduce 
a lot of change in the subsequent values of the 
estimated state variables. This information is very 
useful in detection of the misbehaving sensors and is 
utilized as described below. 
Significant difference was observed between the 
values of the distance among the target and the sensors 
based on the estimated location and RSS. This fact was 
utilized to define a condition based on which malicious 
anchors were identified. A priori distance between the 
MN and the     sensor,      
 , is calculated from the 
corresponding RSS. Its a posteriori estimate,      
 , is 
obtained as the result of the process of estimation. The 
following equations formulate their relation with the 
measured RSS and the estimated location. 
     
  = 10 (  ,    )/                                      (Eq. 12) 
     
  =  ( 
 
−  )  + ( 
 
− 
 
)                    (Eq. 13) 
And the difference of these two distances, ∆ 
 , was 
observed to be a good measure to detect the malicious 
nodes. This is because the false reported location of the 
sensor or RSS value by the malicious node will cause a 
significant difference between the values of      
  and 
     
 . Thus we may define ∆ 
  as follows: 
∆ 
 = |     
  −      
 |                                            (Eq. 14) 
An example of the resulting ∆ 
 s for different nodes of 
a network in which one of the nodes is transmitting its 
location wrongfully is depicted in Fig. 1. In this figure, 
the dotted line represents the average value of ∆ 
 s in 
each time, ∆  
  , defined by Eq. 15. This value is used 
for detection of malicious nodes and refining the 
reported measurements. 
∆  
  =
 
  
∑ ∆ 
     
                                               (Eq. 15) 
Where    is the number of sensors in the network. 
It was observed that higher noise will result in 
rejection of some honest nodes too. To prevent false 
rejection of nodes the distribution of the mean of this 
error when there was no malicious node was studied 
and a threshold on error of measurement for honest 
nodes was derived. 
To obtain the suitable condition many probability 
functions were studied. The following was proved to 
be a good condition, based on which the misbehaving 
nodes could be rejected while the honest nodes are not 
reported as a malicious node in high noise 
deployments. The detection process is to test the 
following condition:  
∆ 
    >    ∆  
  +   × (∆   
  − ∆   
  )             (Eq. 16) 
Where ∆   
  = max  ∆ 
  and ∆   
  = min  ∆ 
 . 
Clearly, if Eq. 16 holds then the corresponding node is 
detected as a malicious node. Afterwards, the measured 
RSS and reported sensor location related to that node is 
removed from the set of network nodes. A statistical 
parameter called   is put in the preceding condition. 
This parameter is derived by statistical study on 
different deployments of sensors with different 
measurement noises. This condition enabled us to 
detect one malicious node among 6 anchors in 78% of 
the times. It should be noted that as the initial start of 
detection process is very dependable on the initial 
conditions for prediction and update phases. If the 
initial state estimate was not accurate, it will take some 
iteration for the filtering process to be able to track the 
MN’s trajectory. This will introduce enough errors that 
the anchors may be detected misbehaving. Thus a 
window is defined after which the process of detection 
will start. With this simple classifier, detection of 
malicious nodes is done after each iteration of the EKF 
tracking and the tracking process will be performed 
again after each of the malicious nodes were detected 
and removed from the set of network nodes. 
Considering the linear relationship between the 
target state and the measurements as defined in Eq. 17, 
the innovation vector (  ) is defined as the difference 
between the measurements and the predicted target 
position (   −   ∙   ). 
 
 
Figure 1 ∆ 
  for different nodes and their average                          Figure 2 ‖  ‖
  for different nodes and their average. 
   =   ∙    +                                                 (Eq. 17) Here ∆ 
  is in fact the innovation vector for the      
sensor. The innovation vector which is a natural 
measure of the discrepancy between the actual 
measurement and the predicted measurement is 
assumed to be normally distributed ( (0,   )).  
Further investigation of the problem revealed that 
the deviation between the predicted and actual 
measurement is reflected much better with Eq. 18: 
‖  ‖
  =   
   
                                                (Eq. 18) 
This measure, also called Mahalanobis norm, was 
proved a more efficient statistical classifier since it 
takes the correlation of the measured data into account. 
The real value of   , the covariance of the innovation 
vector, is estimated after a window of 10 received 
measurements. 
It is shown in Fig. 2 with the same condition as Fig.1. 
As it’s seen the malicious node can be discriminated 
better. 
A threshold based on the new criterion was utilized 
as before to prevent false rejection of the honest nodes. 
The Mahalanobis distance is, however, scale invariant 
as opposed to Euclidean distance and because of this 
the threshold remained constant under different 
conditions. The sensor nodes were detected as 
malicious if the Mahalanobis distance of its reported 
measurements where higher than the average value. As 
before the process of detection will be done in each 
iteration of the EKF tracking and once the malicious 
nodes are detected they will be removed and the 
tracking procedure will be performed again. 
The experimental results demonstrated that with the 
same deployment the malicious node could be 
identified above 85% of times even with higher noise 
powers. 
 
5. Simulation Results 
 
Sensor nodes were uniformly deployed in a 
100  × 100  rectangular region. The target is 
assumed to follow a straight path and the RSS values 
are modeled as described in (Eq. 4) where the noise 
power is assumed to be 0.5dB. The attack was 
simulated by randomly selecting a number of anchors. 
Malicious anchors change the reported locations with a 
normal noise with zero mean and    = 20. The 
network has one malicious anchor and 5 honest 
anchors. The effect of varying the number of malicious 
nodes, anchor nodes and noise power is studied.   
Here the ‘true detection’ refers to the rate of 
malicious anchors being detected and ‘false detection’ 
is occurred when an honest anchor is erroneously 
detected to be misbehaving. 
Fig. 3 shows the number of malicious nodes being 
detected with different number of anchors available for 
the process of tracking. As shown in Fig. 3 remarkably 
high percentage of malicious nodes are detected. 
Fig. 4 shows the obtained MSE as the density of the 
honest anchors is changed. One node is randomly set to 
provide false data. As it is seen that the malicious node 
is detected with high probability and even with the 
presence of the malicious anchor this methods obtains 
very low MSE. 
 
Figure 3 Rate of detection of malicious nodes. There is one 
malicious anchor and 5 honest anchors. 
 
Figure 4 MSE of tracking for different No. of sensors. There 
is one malicious anchor and 5 honest anchors. 
The effect of more malicious anchors on the rate of 
detection is shown in Fig. 5. 
Here a total of 6 anchors are supposed. It was 
observed that as the number of malicious anchors 
where increased the rate of true detection where 
decreased, though the MSE of algorithm has 
maintained a low amount. As seen in Fig. 6 even with 
half of the anchors being malicious this method has 
good performance and the algorithm was able to detect 
many of the misbehaving nodes. Hence, the honest 
nodes should not necessarily outnumber the malicious 
nodes and the bounds that may be imposed on the 
number of malicious anchors for proper operation is 
higher than previously proposed methods.  
 
Figure 5 Rate of detection of malicious nodes. There are a 
total of 6 anchors present. 
 
 
Figure 6 MSE of Tracking for different number of malicious 
nodes. There are a total of 6 anchor nodes. 
 
It is worth mentioning that although false detection 
of sensor nodes generally seems to degrade the 
performance, it will improve the performance when 
higher number of anchors is deployed. This is clearly 
due to the fact that false detection of an anchor is 
because of the high noise of its measurement, the 
removal of which will improve the performance. 
The effect of the location error introduced by 
malicious anchors is studied in Fig. 8. As it’s seen the 
MSE has maintained almost a constant value, however, 
the detection rate may be worse when the introduced 
error is not significant. This is obviously due to the fact 
that with smaller errors the MSE will not deviate much 
from its expected value. 
 
Figure 8 Rate of Detection and MSE of tracking vs. the  
             STD of the noise introduced by malicious anchors. 
             There is one malicious anchor and 5 honest nodes. 
The effect of higher noise on the performance of 
the system is shown in Fig. 7, 8. Obviously higher 
noise power will degrade system performance but this 
had very little effect on performance in terms of 
detection. Here, as expected, noisier deployment along 
with slightly degraded detection rate has increased the 
MSE. 
 
Figure 8 Rate of Detection for different Noise Powers. There 
is one malicious anchor and 5 honest anchors. 
 
Figure 9 MSE of Tracking for different Noise Powers. There 
          is one  malicious anchor and 5 honest anchors. 
6. Conclusions 
 
Many algorithms have been proposed to estimate 
the trajectory of a MN in sensor networks. 
Nevertheless few of which have considered the 
probability of attacks on the tracking procedure. The 
presence of malicious sensors will greatly degrade the 
performance of such algorithms and the conventional 
security mechanisms fail in the presence of 
compromised sensors. In this paper we have presented 
an efficient tracking algorithm applicable to hostile 
environments. The false measurements that malicious 
nodes inject into network are removed and the 
misbehaving anchors are identified. This algorithm was 
evaluated and was proved to provide noticeably good 
performance in terms of rate of detection of the 
malicious sensor nodes, MSE and the low number of 
honest sensors needed for proper operation of the 
algorithm. 
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